Physicians Employed Under the Appearance of Service Procurement in Private Hospitals

Abstract

The employment model of physicians in the private healthcare sector constitutes a sensitive legal issue that cannot be assessed solely through the lens of contractual freedom, due to the nature, continuity, and public character of healthcare services between the parties, due to the nature, continuity, and public aspect of healthcare services. In practice, it is frequently observed that private hospitals, instead of establishing employment contracts with physicians, establish contracts under the guise of purchasing services in exchange for self-employment receipts or company invoices. While this contractual appearance may give the impression of a relationship governed by the law of obligations or commercial law at a superficial examination, the actual working conditions often reveal an employment relationship involving elements of work performance, wages, and dependency. This study examines the phenomenon of employing physicians in private hospitals under the guise of service procurement in order to determine the applicable law. The examination first addresses the distinction between the actual employment relationship and the contractual appearance; then, it demonstrates why explaining this type of dispute with the concept of collusion is dogmatically insufficient. The main thesis of the study is that this practice constitutes fraud against the law in the sense of circumventing mandatory labor law norms, and therefore, labor law should be applied to the actual employment relationship despite the apparent contract. Adopting this approach is essential not only for protecting the individual rights of physicians, but also for safeguarding the fundamental function of maintaining public order and the principle of trust in the law in cases where mandatory labor law rules are deliberately circumvented and rendered ineffective.